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You may not be surprised to learn that the largest shopping center in the 
world isn’t in Southern California, glittering Dubai, or the garden city of 
Singapore, but China. Would you guess, however, that it’s in Chengdu, the 
capital of Sichuan province, deep in the interior of southern China? Better 
known for spicy food and giant pandas, Chengdu is also home to the New 
Century Global Center, the world’s largest building by floor space, nearly 
three times the size of the Pentagon. 
New Century and shopping malls like it are emblematic of the rise of 
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, which is expected to expand from 430 million today to 780 million 
in the mid-2020s. Although Chengdu’s GDP per capita was around 
$13,500 in 2016 (according to official statistics), typical middle-
class living standards in a second-tier city like Chengdu are on par 
with those in some of the poorer states in the United States (not 
least because the cost of living is about half as high as in the United 
States by purchasing power parity estimates). Meanwhile, living 
standards for wealthy families in Beijing and Shanghai can match 
the best the United States has to offer. Ordinary Chinese urbanites 
can afford to shop at mega-malls, own their own cars, and even take 
overseas vacations. 
But the distribution of Chinese shopping malls also shows that middle-class 
life in China is an overwhelmingly urban phenomenon. Even a relatively 
poor city like Chengdu has enough middle-class families to support a New 
Century, while life in rural areas remains tough. For China’s floating 
population of rural-urban migrants, life can be tougher still. 
The fact that China’s urban middle classes are doing pretty well says little 
about whether China has anything like a true middle-class society. Income 
inequality is a problem throughout the world, but in China, inequalities run 
much deeper than in the West. Hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese 
are still excluded from full participation in the country’s rapidly developing 
urban economy. And that exclusion is in danger of ossifying into something 
resembling a permanent caste system. 
Rural realities 
China’s economic growth is legendary, and China really has come a long 
way since Deng Xiaoping declared China open for business 40 years ago. 
The three big urban agglomerations of eastern China — the areas centered 
on Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong — have already converged in GDP 
per capita with developed Asian countries like Taiwan and South Korea, at 
least in purchasing power parity terms. And even poor, inland cities like 
Chengdu are doing well compared to secondary cities in other middle-
income countries. 
But rural China still lags far behind. That’s not surprising; rural areas all 
over the world tend to be poorer than cities 
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. Even in the United States, rural households are on average 4 
percent poorer than urban households. 
But in China, the rural income deficit averages 63 percent nationwide, and 
that’s in a country with a lot of very poor urban areas that outsiders rarely 
hear about. 
China’s population is still 43 percent rural, compared to 18 percent in the 
United States. China’s official statistics don’t report average wages for rural 
areas, since rural residents are expected to live off the land, but they do 
offer an urban-rural split for disposable income. These statistics show 
that urban incomes are on average 2.7 times as high as rural incomes. Put 
these figures together, and rapidly rising urban incomes alone can’t begin 
to lift China as a whole to developed-country living standards. 
Much of the story of China’s economic transformation of the last 40 years 
has been the story of urbanization. Hundreds of millions of people have 
moved from farm to city as China’s urbanization rate increased from 19 
percent in 1979 to nearly 60 percent today. Less well-known is the 
migration from west to east, from the interior to the coast. Western, rural 
Sichuan province has lost one-fifth of its population since 1980 as 
cosmopolitan coastal provinces have boomed. 
Today, China has started to declare its rich eastern cities to be “full.” The 
Chinese government intends to cap Beijing’s population at 23 million, just 1 
million above its current level. Shanghai’s population is to be capped at 25 
million by 2040, a goal that may prove difficult considering that its 
populationalready exceeds 24 million. While these limits are certain to be 
breached, China’s repressive party-state does have the capacity to 
coerce would-be city-dwellers to move elsewhere. 
Destroy the evidence 
It’s not just glamorous megacities like Beijing and Shanghai that are closing 
their doors. Even second-tier cities and provincial capitals like Chengdu are 
increasingly pushing out the poor. Forcible slum clearance in China often 
involves the destruction of so-called urban villages: densely populated but 
often chaotically planned former villages that have been swallowed up by 
the growth of nearby metropolises. 
The most notorious of these forced relocations was the clearance of the 
urban village of Dachong near south China’s tech city of Shenzhen, just 
across the border from Hong Kong. Home to an estimated 70,000 people, 
Dachong was destroyed in 2011 to make way for redevelopment. The even 
larger urban village of Baishizhou, in Shenzhen itself, is in the process of 
being demolished, turning a reported 150,000 people out of their homes. 
Many of them likely have nowhere to go but home — to the countryside. 
Well out of view of the lenses of Western journalists and documentarians, 
Chengdu also went through a period of massive urban clearances for forced 
relocations. Its former Mayor Li Chuncheng was popularly known 
as Demolisher Li before being removed from office and imprisoned for 
corruption. The New Century Global Center was one of the projects he 
made possible, in conjunction with the local party secretary, Huang Xinchu 
(inevitably with a nickname of his own: Digger Huang). How many people 
were dispossessed to make New Century Global Center possible is 
unknown, but one, a middle-aged homeowner named Tang Fuzhen, 
infamously burned herself to death in a final, futile protest against eviction. 
A permit — for a price 
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 The Chinese government’s preferred solution is to hope for a 
repetition of the economic magic of its first-tier megacities in 
the lower tiers of provincial capitals and regional centers. China is 
allowing developers to build like crazy in small third- and fourth-
tier cities (those below the level of provincial capitals), to little avail. 
The government is even trying to get rural-urban migrants to 
move back to the countryside to start rural businesses. 
In theory, Chinese people now have the right to live more or less wherever 
they want — if they can afford it. But the hukou system of household 
registration still limits the level and lifts the price of accessing city services 
for migrant workers who lack local hukou status. The denial of basic 
services such as education and health care is a powerful tool of population 
management, and the population concerned is not small. Roughly one-fifth 
of China’s population, some 250 to 300 million people, have 
irregular hukou status. They often have to leave their children behind in 
rural villages while they look for work in the big eastern cities. 
The reform of the hukou system was a major plank of the 13th Five-Year 
Plan, covering the period from 2016 to 2020. Under the reforms, at 
least 100 millionmigrants are supposed to have their hukou status 
regularized by 2020. This was to be accomplished by encouraging cities to 
experiment with local transition plans. Most first-tier cities opted to 
regularize their populations by simply discouraging 
irregular hukou applicants. Second-tier cities like Chengdu are happy to 
grant local hukou status — to migrants who have a master’s or 
doctoraldegree. Third-tier cities will take you too, if you make a minimum 
investment in local real estate. But what’s the point of legally owning an 
apartment in a third-tier city if you can’t find a job? 
An unevenly prosperous society 
Groucho Marx was famously unwilling to belong to any club that would 
have him as a member. China’s floating population seems to face the same 
dilemma. They’re often unwelcome in the big eastern cities, but they’ve 
long since outgrown life on the farm. With even inland cities like Chengdu 
prospering as major centers for foreign investment, small cities and rural 
areas just can’t compare as places to live, work, and flourish. 
China’s President and Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has 
staked his reputation on a promise to turn China into a moderately 
prosperous societyby 2020. It’s not much of a gamble. China already is a 
“moderately” prosperous society. The real challenge is to grow China into a 
fully prosperous society 
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, and that can only be done by raising the rest of the country to 
something like the income levels that prevail in the eastern coastal 
cities — or at least those of second-tier inland cities like Chengdu. 
That means expanding the middle class, not just by getting a few more 
people over an arbitrary income line, but by expanding economic 
opportunities and fighting social exclusion. Here, the politics get more 
difficult. In a distinctively Chinese form of discrimination, the natives of 
cities like Beijing and Shanghai often look down on their country cousins 
from places like Sichuan. China may not be a democracy, but articulate 
middle-class professionals do have the ability to influence policy, especially 
in their own cities. Increasingly, the policy they want is exclusion. 
China’s prosperity is clearly on display in glitzy shopping centers like 
Chengdu’s New Century Global Center, with its waterslides, ice-skating 
rink, and obligatory luxury boutiques. But you can’t build a truly 
prosperous country on the back of a socially excluded underclass of migrant 
workers and rural poor. China’s Communist Party (and the mainly middle-
class people who form its core constituency) must learn how to share the 
opportunities and benefits of economic growth if China is ever to become a 
fully prosperous society. 
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